Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Alex Francois, a Haitian national, left Haiti in 1979 to reunite with his U.S. citizen father. He has lived in New York City, raised six U.S. citizen children, and suffers from severe mental illnesses, including schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Francois has been hospitalized multiple times for his mental health and has had several encounters with law enforcement, often related to his mental illness. In 2017, he was arrested for trespassing in Texas, found incompetent to stand trial, and subsequently transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially granted Francois withholding of removal, finding that he would likely be persecuted in Haiti due to his mental illness. The IJ based this decision on expert testimony and country conditions evidence, which highlighted the dire conditions and violent treatment of mentally ill individuals in Haitian prisons. The government appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for further factfinding, questioning whether Francois would be singled out for persecution and whether there was a pattern of persecution against similarly situated individuals.The IJ, on remand, reversed the initial decision, denying Francois's claims for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ found that Francois had not proven he would be targeted for persecution in Haiti based on his mental illness. The BIA affirmed this decision, finding no clear error in the IJ's findings. Francois then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit held that the BIA deprived Francois of due process by violating its own regulations, specifically by remanding for further factfinding instead of reviewing the IJ's initial findings for clear error. The court granted Francois's petitions for review, vacated the BIA's orders, and remanded the case for the BIA to review the IJ's initial order under the proper standards of review. View "Francois v. Garland" on Justia Law

Adrian Galvez-Bravo, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1994 and has lived in the Memphis area since then, except for a brief return to Mexico to marry his wife. He has three children, two of whom are U.S. citizens. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging he was a noncitizen present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Galvez-Bravo conceded the charge and sought cancellation of removal under § 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children.An Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed with Galvez-Bravo's assessment of hardship, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, ordering his removal to Mexico. Galvez-Bravo then filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, citing new evidence, including his daughter's recent dyslexia diagnosis and the potential impact on his children's education and well-being if he were removed. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence did not meet the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the legal challenges presented by Galvez-Bravo, noting that his arguments focused on whether the BIA engaged in reasoned decision-making. The court found that the BIA had articulated a rational explanation for its decision, considering the new evidence but determining that the hardship did not exceed what would normally be expected upon the removal of a close family member. The court also rejected Galvez-Bravo's argument that the BIA's decision was inconsistent with its prior decisions, noting that the unpublished decisions he cited did not establish a pattern of conflicting outcomes.The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galvez-Bravo's motion to reopen and denied his petition for review. View "Galvez-Bravo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the "metering" policy implemented by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Under this policy, asylum seekers without valid travel documents were turned away when ports of entry were deemed at capacity. Plaintiffs, including an immigrant rights organization and individual asylum seekers, argued that this policy unlawfully prevented them from applying for asylum. They also challenged the subsequent application of the "Asylum Transit Rule," which required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country before seeking it in the U.S., to those turned away under the metering policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found the metering policy unlawful under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates that courts compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to those turned away under the metering policy before the rule took effect. The court also ordered the government to unwind past asylum denials based on the rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA § 706(1) and due process claims but did not reach the APA § 706(2) claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the metering policy violated § 706(1) of the APA, holding that noncitizens stopped at the border are eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and that border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court also affirmed the classwide declaratory relief but vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim, deeming it unnecessary. The court affirmed the negative injunctive relief prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to class members but vacated the portion of the injunction requiring the government to reopen or reconsider past asylum denials on its own initiative, as it violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). View "AL OTRO LADO V. AMAYORKAS" on Justia Law

A mother and her child from El Salvador sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. They claimed persecution by the M-18 gang, which had murdered the child's father, Carlos, and subsequently threatened their lives. After the father's murder, the gang members, including one of the convicted murderers, began following and threatening the child, Javi, demanding he join the gang or face death along with his family. The threats and subsequent break-in by armed men at their home led them to flee to the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the mother’s testimony credible but denied their applications, concluding that the threats and harassment did not amount to past persecution and that the feared harm was due to generalized violence rather than a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the experiences did not rise to the level of persecution and that the gang's motives were not sufficiently linked to the family's relationship to Carlos.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the threats and harassment, combined with the gang's capability and willingness to carry out the threats, constituted persecution. The court also found that the BIA erred in not considering the psychological harm suffered by Javi, who was diagnosed with PTSD, and in failing to account for his young age. Additionally, the court determined that the gang's motives included targeting Javi because of his relationship to Carlos, satisfying the nexus requirement for both asylum and withholding of removal.The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part, recognizing the past persecution and the protected ground nexus, and remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether the persecution was by forces the government was unable or unwilling to control, or if there was a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "CORPENO-ROMERO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States on a tourist visa in January 2000 and overstayed. In April 2018, he applied for asylum, citing his dangerous job as a bodyguard for a congressman in Guatemala and fear of extortion and threats from gang members. Removal proceedings were initiated against him, and he conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His application mentioned only one entry into the U.S. and claimed ignorance of the one-year filing requirement for asylum.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing in December 2018, where the petitioner testified about his fears of returning to Guatemala. The IJ found the petitioner not credible due to inconsistencies between his oral testimony and written application, such as unlisted entries into the U.S. and unmentioned incidents of threats. The IJ also noted the petitioner's use of false documentation and legal violations in the U.S. The IJ found no extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late asylum application and determined that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ also found insufficient evidence for CAT protection.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in September 2023, agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA noted the lack of evidence of threats in the past twenty years and upheld the IJ's findings on withholding of removal and CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination and agreed that the petitioner had not established eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. The petition for judicial review was denied. View "Garcia Oliva v. Garland" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed fraudulent franchise opportunities to foreign nationals seeking to invest in the United States to obtain residency visas. The complaint included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misrepresented the nature of the investment opportunities, leading the plaintiffs to believe they were purchasing franchises that would qualify them for E-2 or EB-5 visas. Instead, they received licenses that did not meet visa requirements, resulting in financial losses and visa application issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege a cognizable enterprise under RICO and failed to meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, citing undue delay and the plaintiffs' failure to provide a proposed amended complaint or additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to plead a RICO enterprise, as the complaint did not provide sufficient factual detail to support the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. The court also upheld the dismissal of the fraud and fraudulent inducement claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint and the dismissal of claims against certain defendants for failure to effect timely service of process. View "Crosswell v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Luis Efrain Vargas-Salazar, his wife Wilma Jeaneth Vargas-Lasso, and their son Maykel Eliab Vargas-Vargas, natives of Ecuador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their applications for asylum. Vargas-Salazar also contested the denial of his application for withholding of removal. The family entered the United States without inspection in June 2021 and conceded removability. Vargas-Salazar filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), naming his wife and son as derivative beneficiaries.The IJ held a hearing and found Vargas-Salazar's testimony credible. He testified about extortion attempts by a gang in Ecuador, which included threats and a physical altercation resulting in a head injury. The IJ concluded that the harm Vargas-Salazar suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution and that there was no sufficient nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The IJ also denied the application for withholding of removal and CAT protection, finding no evidence of likely future torture by government officials.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the harm Vargas-Salazar experienced did not constitute persecution and that the threats were not severe enough to cause significant suffering. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that there was no nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The BIA noted that the petitioner's CAT claim was waived as it was not raised on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and applied the substantial evidence standard to the IJ's factual findings. The court found that substantial evidence supported the IJ and BIA's conclusions that the harm did not amount to past persecution and that there was no well-founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vargas-Salazar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jose Mauricio Figueroa, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him in 2007. In 2018, Figueroa appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) to request relief, arguing that his removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to himself or his spouse, Maria. Figueroa and DHS agreed that a heightened NACARA standard applied due to his criminal history, requiring him to show continuous physical presence in the U.S. for ten years, good moral character, and the specified hardship.The IJ found that Figueroa had lived in the U.S. for thirty years, worked, and managed finances for two properties he and Maria owned. Despite acknowledging the emotional and economic hardship Maria would face, the IJ concluded that Figueroa did not meet the burden of proving exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also noted Figueroa's health issues but found no credible evidence that he would be unable to obtain medical care or employment in El Salvador. Additionally, the IJ determined that Figueroa did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion due to his repeated arrests for indecent assault and battery.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Figueroa's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's application of the hardship standard. The BIA found that Figueroa had not proven that he and Maria would be unable to secure employment or meet their basic needs in El Salvador. The BIA also noted that general crime conditions in El Salvador did not meet the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the application of the hardship standard to the established facts was reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact. The court found no error in the agency's conclusion that Figueroa failed to establish the requisite hardship to himself or Maria. The petition for review was denied. View "Figueroa v. Garland" on Justia Law

A mother and her two minor children, who entered the United States seeking asylum, were scheduled for an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in Seattle, Washington. On their way to the hearing, they encountered two major car accidents, causing them to be two hours late. Upon arrival, they attempted to have their case heard but were unsuccessful. The IJ ordered them removed in absentia. They promptly moved to reopen the case, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified their late arrival.The IJ denied the motion, stating that ordinary traffic delays do not constitute exceptional circumstances and that the mother failed to make a prima facie case for asylum. The IJ did not address the minor children’s claims or their eligibility for derivative citizenship through their father. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the petitioners failed to establish exceptional circumstances and that the children did not demonstrate eligibility for adjustment of status through their newly naturalized father.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJ and BIA abused their discretion by not considering the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that the petitioners did everything reasonably possible to attend their hearing, including leaving home early and documenting the extraordinary traffic caused by the accidents. The court also found that the IJ and BIA failed to consider the petitioners' lack of motive to evade the hearing and the unconscionable results of the in absentia removal order, particularly for the minor children eligible for derivative citizenship.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the facts amounted to exceptional circumstances warranting reopening of the in absentia removal order. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MONTEJO-GONZALEZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Four noncitizens from India, who have been lawfully residing in the U.S. for over ten years, filed for permanent residency more than four years ago. Their applications have not been adjudicated, prompting them to sue the Director of USCIS and the Secretary of DOS under the APA for unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding of agency action. They argue that USCIS's policy of not adjudicating applications until a visa is "immediately available" violates 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 1255(a) was incorrect and that the agencies' policies were within their discretion. The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding under the APA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The appellate court held that § 1255(a) sets eligibility criteria for applying for adjustment of status but does not mandate the timing of adjudication. The court found that the 1976 amendment to § 1255(a) did not preclude USCIS from considering visa availability at the time of approval. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' structural arguments based on other statutory provisions, finding no conflict with USCIS's policy. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA against both USCIS and DOS. View "Patel v. Jaddou" on Justia Law