Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States following prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Section 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is, therefore, facially invalid.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court wrote that Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that Section 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The court held that the district court erred factually and legally in holding otherwise. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a more deferential framework. As drafted, Section 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The panel, therefore, turned to the question of whether Defendant carried his burden of showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting Section 1326. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s argument that a Senate Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that Section 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory animus. View "USA V. GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends-of-justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. First, the district court’s finding that the ends of justice were best served by granting continuances during the period from August 14, 2020, until December 1, 2020, was timely because the district court put this finding on the record during the July 12, 2021, hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. Section 3162(a)(2). The continuances were also specifically limited in time to successive 30-day periods. Next, the district court made the requisite findings under Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause. View "USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that she is ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(2), a provision whose language was originally adopted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and that outlines the conditions under which certain “battered spouses or children” qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal. As relevant here, it requires a petitioning alien to show that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by her spouse or parent. Petitioner contends that the Immigration Judge and the BIA made two errors in refusing her cancellation request. First, she maintains that, as a matter of law, they misinterpreted the statutory term “extreme cruelty” to require proof of physical—as distinguished from mental or emotional—abuse. And second, she asserts that having misread the law, the IJ and the BIA wrongly concluded that she doesn’t qualify for discretionary relief.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Petitioner that the IJ and the BIA misinterpreted Section 1229b(b)(2) and thereby applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating her request for cancellation of removal. The court explained that the term “extreme cruelty” does not require a petitioning alien to prove that she suffered physical abuse in order to qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal; proof of mental or emotional abuse is sufficient to satisfy the “extreme cruelty” prong of Section 1229b(b)(2)’s five-prong standard. Accordingly, the court granted her petition for review and remand to the BIA for further consideration. View "Esmelda Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Agnes Mukantagara, and her son, Plaintiff Ebenezer Shyaka, challenged an unfavorable United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) decision on refugee status. Meanwhile, the government began separate removal proceedings. Plaintiffs filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah seeking judicial review of the termination of their refugee status. Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the agency action was not final and because of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In the district court’s view, the regulation implementing the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provision allowing for the termination of refugee status, 8 C.F.R § 207.9, constitutes a triggering event that “arises from” an action taken to remove an alien. The district court said Plaintiffs’ claims fell within the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) because they challenged the decision “to seek removal.” The district court dismissed the action, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the district court read the statute too expansively. “Congress did not intend the zipper clause 'to cut off claims that have a tangential relationship with pending removal proceedings.' ... the regulation strips USCIS’s discretion whether it should take action to remove an alien under the circumstances.” USCIS’s decision “is not a decision to ‘commence proceedings,’ much less to ‘adjudicate’ a case or ‘execute’ a removal order.” View "Mukantagara, et al. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court granting Appellants attorney's fees under the the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which entitles a prevailing party in certain civil actions against the United States to remove attorney's fees unless the government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust, holding that there was no error.Appellants brought this challenge against the Department of Homeland Security and its agency, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), after USCIS administratively closed each Appellant's application to adjust status, seeking attorney's fees under the EAJA. Determining that the government's position was substantially justified, the district court denied attorney's fees for the proceedings before the court but granted Appellants EAJA fees for the ensuing appellate proceedings that the government voluntarily dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed both rulings, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying EAJA fees related to the challenges before it; and (2) the district court did not err in its calculation of the EAJA award for the appellate proceedings abandoned by the government. View "Michel v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the immigration judge (IJ) denying Appellant's applications for asylum and withholding of removal and denied Appellant's petition for review as to Appellant's claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that remand was required for further proceedings.In denying Appellant's claims for asylum and related relief the IJ concluded that Appellant had failed to establish the requisite basis of fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the decisions in part, holding (1) Appellant was statutorily eligible for asylum on political opinion grounds; (2) because neither the IJ nor the BIA confronted the merits of Appellant's withholding of removal claim, remand was required for the IJ to assess the evidence in the first instance; and (3) the BIA's denial of Appellant's application for CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence. View "Mendez Esteban v. Garland" on Justia Law

Kosh, a Liberian citizen, arrived in the U.S. in 2001 with a false Portuguese passport and requested entry under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 8 U.S.C. 1187(a). Like all VWP entrants, Kosh signed waived any right “to contest, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, any action for removal.” Kosh confessed his Portuguese passport was fake and sought asylum. Kosh feared returning to Liberia, which had an ongoing civil war. His father had been murdered and Kosh was arrested before escaping and fleeing to the U.S. The IJ granted Kosh asylum. Kosh married and had four children. He left the U.S. in 2005 using his refugee travel document and apparently re-entered that year.Kosh was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and filing false and fraudulent income tax returns. USCIS denied Kosh’s application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. His criminal convictions could make him ineligible for adjustment of status, but DHS can waive inadmissibility “for humanitarian purposes.” An IJ reopened Kosh’s asylum-only proceeding and terminated his asylum status. Kosh argued that DHS, instead of reopening his earlier proceedings, should have filed removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1229a, which would allow him to seek adjustment of status.The Third Circuit granted Kosh’s motion for a stay of removal and vacated. If Kosh re-entered the country as an asylee without signing a new VWP form, he is entitled to complete-jurisdiction proceedings in which he can raise an adjustment-of-status claim. View "Kosh Ishmael v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Santos-Zacaria, a noncitizen in removal proceedings, was denied protection from removal. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Santos-Zacaria’s petition for review in part, finding that she had not satisfied 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1)’s (Judicial Review of Orders of Removal) exhaustion requirement, which it raised sua sponte based on its characterization of 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. Santos-Zacaria did not raise her impermissible fact-finding claim to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in a motion for reconsideration before filing her petition for judicial review.The Supreme Court vacated in part. Section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. To ensure that courts impose the harsh consequences of jurisdictional rules only when Congress unmistakably has so instructed, a rule is treated as jurisdictional “only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Section 1252(d)(1) lacks a clear statement. Exhaustion requirements are quintessential claim-processing rules, designed to promote efficiency in litigation. Section 1252(d)(1)’s language differs substantially from the jurisdictional language in related statutory provisions. Section 1252(d)(1) requires exhausting only remedies available “as of right,” meaning review that is guaranteed, not discretionary. Reconsideration by the BIA, however, is discretionary. The right to request discretionary review does not make a remedy available as of right. The Court noted the practical problems that would arise under the government’s interpretation. View "Santos-Zacaria v. Garland" on Justia Law

Banuelos-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, arrived in the U.S. in 1999. DHS began removal proceedings in 2010. Those proceedings were administratively closed and re-calendared at the Department’s request. In 2017, Arkansas police arrested Banuelos-Jimenez following a “screaming” incident with his wife. He pleaded guilty to, third-degree assault on a family or household member. DHS re-initiated removal proceedings.Banuelos-Jimenez applied for cancellation of removal. An IJ denied his application, concluding that the Arkansas statute was a crime of violence: Banuelos-Jimenez acted at least recklessly and that “crimes of violence” encompass not only crimes that require specific intent but also reckless conduct. The BIA affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” holding that a crime of violence does not encompass reckless conduct, the BIA concluded that Banuelos-Jimenez’s conviction was a crime of violence—his conduct was also purposeful and necessarily involved a threat of force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Arkansas conviction is categorically a crime of violence because it involves the “threatened use of force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). While the statute may not require the perpetrator to intend actual harm, he still intends to threaten harm. View "Banuelos-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law