Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Turcios-Flores and her husband operated merchant stands in Honduras and were subject to a “war tax” imposed by the MS-13 gang. Turcios-Flores’s husband inherited a farm, where they grew coffee and plantains, careful not to reveal their ownership. A cousin later joined MS-13 and shared Turcios-Flores’s secret landownership. MS-13 demanded additional payment in an amount 100 times greater than what the family had previously paid, threatening to kill her husband. Turcios-Flores’s husband fled to the U.S. alone, hoping that MS-13 would stop threatening his family. The gang then threatened Turcios-Flores herself. Turcios-Flores complied. MS-13 increased their demands, warning Turcios-Flores that her children would be killed if she did not pay. The police only offered her a phone number to call if gang members returned. Turcios-Flores and her children entered the U.S. without the required entry documents. She filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on behalf of her and her sons.The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for review, in part. The Board correctly denied Turcios-Flores’s application for CAT protection and her asylum application insofar as it relates to her membership in her husband’s family. The decision with respect to two of Turcios-Flores’s additional proposed social groups (rural landowners or farmers, single mothers living without male protection) was not supported by substantial evidence, however, and the withholding-of-removal analysis was flawed. View "Turcios-Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal. Petitioner is an auto mechanic from Guatemala. He testified that in February 2013, he took the bus to buy some tools. On the bus ride home, three men robbed him and the other passengers on the bus. He did not see the faces of two of the robbers. One of the men pressed a knife against Petitioner’s right side and took one of his cell phones and his wallet. The Attorney General initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. He then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. To the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Petitioner argued that he was persecuted for his “anti-gang” political opinion and for his membership in the particular social group of witnesses who cooperate with law enforcement. The IJ denied his application, concluding that Petitioner did not show that his proposed social group is cognizable. Petitioner appealed to the BIA, which adopted the IJ’s decision. Petitioner appealed the BIA’s decision.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court explained that it agrees with the BIA that Petitioner has not proven that his proposed social group is socially distinct. Further, neither the BIA nor the IJ applied a presumption against Petitioner’s asylum claim on the ground that private, not government, actors allegedly persecuted him. And even if they had, remand would be unnecessary because the court already concluded that Petitioner has not proven membership in a cognizable social group. View "Jaime Oxlaj v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner has been ordered removed from the United States to Mexico. Petitioner concedes that he is removable but seeks cancellation of removal based on the hardship his removal would cause his family. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation, and Petitioner petitioned the court for review. Petitioner’s challenge is twofold. First, he contends that the IJ and the BIA failed to use the proper legal standard to assess his eligibility for discretionary relief. Second, he argued that the BIA erred by failing to remand his case to the IJ for consideration of new evidence as well as a potential grant of voluntary departure.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the IJ and BIA thoroughly considered each of Petitioner’s hardship arguments and applied the appropriate legal standard. The BIA also considered the new evidence presented by Petitioner but concluded that this evidence was unlikely to change the IJ’s decision. The record supports the conclusion that Petitioner failed to show that the consequences of his removal are “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves his country.” Further, Petitioner did not present this argument to the BIA, and a petitioner “must fairly present an issue to the BIA to satisfy Section 1252(d)’s exhaustion requirement.” View "Rangel Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States illegally in 2016. After DHS charged him with being subject to removal Petitioner filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied relief from removal, and the BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner's unexhausted claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination, and the agency committed no errors of law in that ruling. View "Santos Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition challenging a final administrative removal order on grounds that Petitioner derived United States citizenship as a child, holding that there was no error.Petitioner, who was born in India, entered the U.S. as a child without lawful immigration status. Petitioner was later convicted by a Massachusetts state court of second-degree murder and sentenced in life in prison. After Petitioner was granted parole, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with being removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. In response, Petitioner asserted that he was not removable because he had derived U.S. citizenship from his mother pursuant to former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. DNA rejected Petitioner's reading of former section 321(a) and ordered him removed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that his arguments contesting removability were unavailing. View "Sharma v. Garland" on Justia Law

Caldera-Torres, a citizen of Mexico in the U.S. without permission, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). To be eligible for that relief an alien must show that he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Caldera-Torres has a Wisconsin conviction for battery, arising from an attack on the mother of his daughter. An IJ and the BIA concluded that this conviction makes Caldera-Torres ineligible.The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Caldera-Torres’s argument that, although Wis. Stat. 940.19(1) qualifies as a federal “crime of violence,” it is not a crime of domestic violence, because the victim’s identity is not an element of the offense. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) does not say or imply that the “protected person” aspect of the definition must be an element of the crime. It is enough that the victim’s status as a “protected person” be established. A “crime of domestic violence” is a generic “crime of violence” plus the victim’s status as a “protected person.” All other circuits that have addressed section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) recently have held that the victim’s status as a “protected person” need not be an element of the crime of conviction. It is irrelevant how Wisconsin classified Caldera-Torres’s conviction for its own purposes. View "Caldera-Torres v. Garland" on Justia Law

Cortez-Amador, age 16, fled from Guatemala in 2016, following his father’s murder by gang members. He entered the U.S. without inspection and was placed by in his sister’s custody. In 2020, USCIS granted him Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), which is available after a juvenile court finds it would not be in the child’s best interest to return to their country of last habitual residence. An SIJS recipient may pursue legal permanent residency.In 2019, while awaiting his SIJS classification, Cortez-Amador was charged with sexual assault on a child under the age of 13. He pleaded guilty to nonsexual child endangerment and admitted giving the alleged victim a cigarette. He was sentenced to 364 days' incarceration. Charged as removable, Cortez-Amador argued that his SIJS exempted him from removal; he should be granted an adjustment of status; and he was entitled to asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158), withholding of removal (1231(b)(3)), and/or Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection because the group that killed his father would target him in Guatemala.An IJ denied relief. The BIA affirmed, agreeing that SIJS parole applies for adjustment of status only, not removal; that the IJ properly exercised its discretion in denying an adjustment of status; and that any harm did not rise to the level of past persecution, so Cortez-Amador had no objectively reasonable fear of future harm. The Third Circuit rejected a petition for review, stating that the agency decisions do not reflect any error of law or are otherwise supported by substantial evidence. View "Cortez-Amador v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a review of the denial of his claim to protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge found that Petitioner, a bisexual man and former gang member, had not shown the requisite likelihood that he would be tortured if returned to his home country of Jamaica. Petitioner now challenged that finding on appeal, arguing that it does not properly account for his aggregate risk of torture as required by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968 (4th Cir. 2019).   The Fourth Circuit disagreed and denied the petition. The court explained that it is abundantly clear that both the IJ and the BIA applied the aggregation rule of Rodriguez-Arias, considering not only the individual risk of torture from each actor identified by Petitioner but also the cumulative probability of torture. The IJ recognized from the start, in laying out the applicable law, that “the risks of torture from all sources must be aggregated when determining whether an individual is more likely than not to be tortured in a particular country.”   Further, the court reasoned that Petitioner identified no record evidence suggesting that he would be singled out for torture as, say, a “bisexual former gang member” and thus subjected to a risk of torture greater than the “sum of its parts” – greater, that is, than the risk captured by aggregating the likelihood of torture based on sexual orientation with the risk of torture based on former gang membership. View "O' Neil Kerr v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

A federal jury convicted Petitioners of visa fraud, and the government charged them with removability based on that conviction. Petitioners contend that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in holding that the visa fraud waiver could not overcome the grounds for their removal. Petitioners also raised a due process claim and issues the BIA did not address.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and denied it in part. The court held that Section 1227(a)(1)(H) does not function to waive a charge under Section 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii). The BIA’s treatment of Petitioners, in this case, is dissimilar and far from arbitrary—the government charged them with removability for fraud convictions under a provision intended to make aliens removable for committing specifically that crime. The government simply applied the law as Congress wrote it. Further, the court wrote that the IJ and the BIA found no need to consider Petitioners’ other arguments. Petitioners submitted significant evidence to the agency and were afforded multiple oral hearings to present their case, where the IJ reviewed their evidence. Petitioners were also afforded the opportunity to argue their theory of the law. Thus, Petitioners have not shown a violation of their due process rights. View "Reese v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his application for cancellation of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). After an immigration judge (“IJ”) initially granted cancellation, the BIA reversed, determining that Petitioner was statutorily eligible for cancellation but did not merit a favorable exercise of the agency’s discretion in light of his criminal history— namely, his two convictions for domestic violence. Petitioner objected to the BIA’s characterization of his criminal history, arguing that it impermissibly engaged in factfinding and reevaluated the IJ’s factual findings.   The Second Circuit dismissed the petition, holding that it lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision. The court explained that the BIA did not second-guess the IJ’s factual findings or find facts of its own—it conducted a de novo reweighing of the equities based on the facts found by the IJ. The BIA thus properly exercised its discretion to deny cancellation of removal. View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law