Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioners, Fidel Angel Lopez Quinteros, Evelyn de Los Angeles Polanco Ortiz, and their minor child A.A.L.P., are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They were issued Notices to Appear by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2021, charging them with being present in the United States without admission or parole. The petitioners conceded their removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). A.A.L.P. was listed as a derivative beneficiary on Lopez's application. The petition for review challenges only the denial of their asylum applications.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lopez and Polanco's testimonies credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ concluded that the gang's threats were motivated by financial gain rather than the petitioners' membership in particular social groups. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on asylum and withholding of removal and deemed the CAT claims waived as they were not meaningfully challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitioners' claim that the BIA erred by not remanding to correct the hearing transcript, as this issue was not exhausted before the BIA. The court also found no merit in the petitioners' contention that the agency failed to engage in a proper mixed-motive analysis. However, the court held that the BIA's finding of no nexus between Polanco's persecution and her familial relationship to Lopez was not supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that Polanco's family status was a central reason for the gang's threats against her. Consequently, the court denied the petition in part, granted it in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lopez-Quinteros v. Garland" on Justia Law

Chrisma Felin Mondzali Bopaka, a citizen of the Republic of the Congo, entered the United States without valid entry documents on August 23, 2018. He sought asylum, withholding of removal (WOR), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution based on his political opinion and family membership. Bopaka alleged that his family was targeted due to his father's opposition to the government, and he feared harm if returned to the Congo.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Bopaka not credible due to numerous inconsistencies and omissions in his testimony, declaration, and documentary evidence. The IJ denied his applications for asylum, WOR, and CAT protection, concluding that Bopaka failed to meet his burden of proof. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no error in the adverse credibility determination and insufficient corroborating evidence. The BIA also denied Bopaka's motions to remand and reopen, citing a lack of new, material evidence that could change the outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ's and BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting significant inconsistencies and omissions in Bopaka's accounts. The court also agreed with the BIA's assessment that the new evidence presented in the motions to remand and reopen was insufficient to alter the previous findings. Consequently, the petitions for review were denied. View "Mondzali Bopaka v. Garland" on Justia Law

Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for her noncitizen spouse, Ala’a Hamayel. Initially, USCIS approved the petition. However, two years later, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke the approval based on evidence suggesting that Hamayel had previously entered into a sham marriage to evade immigration laws. Despite Bouarfa's denial of the allegations, USCIS revoked the petition approval under the Secretary of Homeland Security's authority to revoke for "good and sufficient cause." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the revocation.Bouarfa challenged the revocation in federal court, arguing that the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred judicial review of the agency's discretionary decisions. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, agreeing that the Secretary's revocation authority under 8 U.S.C. §1155 was discretionary and thus not subject to judicial review.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the revocation of an approved visa petition under §1155, based on a sham-marriage determination, is a discretionary decision falling within the purview of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). This statute strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain discretionary actions by the agency. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, concluding that the Secretary's decision to revoke the visa petition was indeed discretionary and not subject to judicial review. View "Bouarfa v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of companies, sought refunds for H-1B visa petitions they filed on behalf of their foreign national employees who were already in the United States under a different nonimmigrant classification. They argued that the enhanced fees imposed by the government for these petitions were not applicable to change of status petitions, which involve nonimmigrants already in the U.S.The United States Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument. The court found that the statutory language did not exclude change of status petitions from the enhanced fees. The court interpreted the phrase "application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of such status" to include change of status petitions, as these petitions are a sub-category of initial grant petitions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the statutory language "an application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of such status" does not exclude change of status petitions. The court reasoned that a strict application of the statutory definitions would render part of the statute meaningless and that the ordinary meaning of the phrase includes change of status petitions. The court also noted that this interpretation aligns with longstanding USCIS practice and the legislative intent behind the statute. As a result, the plaintiffs' claim for a refund was denied, and the government's imposition of the enhanced fees was upheld. View "Itserve Alliance, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Andre Louis Keller drove to a permanent immigration checkpoint where a Customs & Border Protection (CBP) canine alerted to his vehicle. Upon searching, agents found an alien unlawfully present in the United States concealed under luggage. Keller conditionally pleaded guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a hearing on Keller’s motion to suppress. Testimonies were provided by CBP Agent Jesse Sandoval, Matthew B. Devaney from CBP’s Canine Academy, and Andre Falco Jimenez, a private police dog trainer. The district court denied Keller’s motion, leading to his conditional guilty plea. Keller was sentenced to 20 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. He then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that stopping a vehicle for brief questioning at a permanent immigration checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment search and does not require probable cause. The court found that the canine’s alert provided probable cause to search Keller’s vehicle. The court also concluded that the canine’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search and that the district court did not err in its ruling. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Keller’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law

Simon Quito-Guachichulca, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an "aggravated felony" under federal law, making him deportable. Initially, the government classified the crime as a "crime of violence," but the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya rendered that classification impermissibly vague. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration.On remand, the government reclassified Quito's crime as "rape," another type of "aggravated felony." Both an immigration judge and the BIA agreed with this classification. Quito then petitioned for review, arguing that the government’s change in theory violated the doctrine of res judicata. The Eighth Circuit found that res judicata did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits due to the vacated order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute fits the federal definition of "rape" under immigration law. The court applied the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements rather than Quito's actual conduct. The court determined that the federal definition of "rape" in 1996 did not include digital or mechanical penetration, which is covered under Minnesota’s statute. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a categorical mismatch between the state and federal definitions.The Eighth Circuit granted Quito's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not qualify as "rape" under federal immigration law. View "Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1999, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to support a finding of guilty for distributing a class A substance. He later sought to withdraw this admission, claiming his plea counsel failed to inform him that it would lead to mandatory deportation. The defendant, a legal permanent resident since 1994, argued that he would have insisted on going to trial had he known the immigration consequences, citing his strong ties to the United States, including his American citizen wife and children, and his consistent employment as a welder.The defendant's initial motion for a new trial was denied due to the absence of an affidavit from his plea counsel. He then filed a renewed motion with the necessary affidavit, which was also denied by a District Court judge after a non-evidentiary hearing. The judge concluded that while the plea counsel was ineffective, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The Appeals Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, focusing on whether the defendant established prejudice from his counsel's ineffectiveness. The court found that the motion judge improperly assessed the defendant's claim by not applying the reasonable person standard and by making credibility determinations about the defendant's assertion that he would have gone to trial. The court vacated the denial of the renewed motion and remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant's ties to the United States constituted special circumstances and whether a reasonable person in his situation would have chosen to go to trial if properly advised. View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Jose Rodolfo Escobar Larin, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Escobar also petitioned for review of a separate BIA ruling that denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued Escobar a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for being present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Escobar filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in El Salvador due to his mental illness and opposition to gang authority.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Escobar credible but denied his claims, determining that his asylum application was untimely and that he failed to meet the requirements for withholding of removal and CAT protection. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Escobar did not demonstrate extraordinary or changed circumstances to excuse the late filing of his asylum application. The BIA also found that Escobar did not establish a likelihood of persecution or torture if returned to El Salvador.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of the changed-circumstance exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. The court vacated and remanded the BIA's ruling on Escobar's asylum claims, withholding of removal claims, and CAT claim for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the denial of Escobar's motion to reopen, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in that decision. View "Escobar Larin v. Garland" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

The State of Texas placed a concertina wire fence along part of the border with Mexico in the Eagle Pass area to deter illegal crossings. The United States Border Patrol agents cut the wire multiple times, claiming it was necessary to fulfill their duty of patrolling the border to prevent illegal entry. Texas sued for an injunction, arguing that the Border Patrol was needlessly cutting the wire. The district court found that the Border Patrol was not hampered by the wire and had breached it numerous times without apparent purpose other than to allow migrants easier entrance. However, the court denied the injunction, citing the United States' sovereign immunity against Texas's claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, despite agreeing with Texas on the facts. The court believed that the United States retained sovereign immunity. A motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and granted a temporary injunction pending appeal. The United States sought relief in the Supreme Court, which vacated the injunction without providing reasons. The case was remanded to the district court to investigate events in Shelby Park, where Texas's actions were alleged to have obstructed Border Patrol operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity as to Texas's state law claims under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected the United States' arguments that the injunction was barred by intergovernmental immunity and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that Texas satisfied the injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, with modifications based on the district court's supplemental fact findings. View "Texas v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law