Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves the Trump administration's "Remain in Mexico" policy, also known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which required asylum seekers arriving at the U.S. southern border to stay in Mexico while their claims were processed. The policy was first implemented in 2019, causing significant hardships for asylum seekers, including unsafe living conditions and limited access to legal representation. The Biden administration terminated the policy in 2021, but the second Trump administration sought to reimplement it in January 2025.The Central District of California reviewed the case and granted an emergency stay of the policy's reimplementation, citing violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and constitutional rights. The district court found that the policy severely impeded asylum seekers' access to legal representation and created dangerous conditions for them in Mexico. The government appealed the stay, arguing that it interfered with its discretionary authority to manage immigration and foreign policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal and partially granted the government's motion for a stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit limited the district court's stay to apply only to the current and future clients of the Immigrant Defenders Law Center (ImmDef), allowing the government to reimplement the policy for other asylum seekers. The court found that ImmDef had standing to challenge the policy and that the reimplementation likely violated the APA by infringing on asylum seekers' statutory rights to apply for asylum with the assistance of counsel. View "Immigrant Defenders Law Center v. Noem" on Justia Law

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Marcos Da Silva Borges, his wife Eliane Maria Silva Teixeira Borges, and their two children entered the United States in October 2021 and were charged with inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The family argued that the government needed to prove their noncitizen status by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, a higher standard than "clear and convincing" evidence. They also contended that the government failed to meet this burden with the evidence presented. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) both ruled against the family, applying the "clear and convincing" standard.The IJ initially denied the family's motion to terminate the removal proceedings, finding that the government met its burden of proof. The BIA remanded the case for a full decision, which the IJ provided, again using the "clear and convincing" standard. The BIA upheld this decision, rejecting the family's arguments about the standard of proof and the reliability of the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court referenced its recent decision in Rosa v. Bondi, which held that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard applies in removal proceedings for individuals charged with inadmissibility and that this standard is more demanding than "clear and convincing" evidence. The court found that the agency applied the incorrect legal standard in evaluating the Borges family's removability. Consequently, the First Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the correct standard of proof. View "Da Silva Borges v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Tarlochan Singh, a Sikh man from India, fled to the United States in 2010 after suffering repeated violence due to his political affiliations. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, and Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied his applications in 2017, finding his claims credible but insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision in 2018.Singh attempted to file a petition for review with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but his attorney failed to meet the statutory deadline. Singh then filed a motion to reopen and reissue the BIA's decision, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Singh did not meet the procedural requirements. Singh filed another motion to reconsider, which was also denied by the BIA for being untimely and number barred, among other reasons. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to consider the merits of Singh's ineffective assistance claim, but the BIA again denied the motion, citing failure to meet procedural requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Singh's petition and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that Singh failed to comply with the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as outlined in Matter of Lozada. Specifically, Singh did not provide a detailed account of his agreement with his attorney, did not notify his attorney of the allegations, and did not provide proof of filing a disciplinary complaint. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Elizabeth Mejia-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Honduras, arrived in the United States with her children in June 2018. They were placed in immigration removal proceedings in October 2018. Mejia conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming fear of persecution in Honduras from a man who allegedly killed six members of her family. The immigration judge (IJ) found her ineligible for asylum, denied her requests for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT, and ordered her removal to Honduras.Mejia appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which upheld the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. The Board agreed with the IJ that Mejia did not timely object to the Notice to Appear (NTA) defects and had waived her objection by conceding removability. The Board also found insufficient evidence that Mejia had suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution, attributing the violence to a personal dispute rather than her membership in a particular social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Mejia had suffered past persecution due to credible, serious threats and actual violence against her family by Cesar Ramirez Mejia. The court also determined that Mejia had a well-founded fear of future persecution, as Cesar had carried out his threats by killing many of her relatives. The court concluded that Mejia's family relationships were the reason she was targeted, establishing the requisite nexus between her family membership and the persecution.The Seventh Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the Board for further consideration of whether the Honduran government was sufficiently involved in Cesar’s persecution of Mejia. View "Mejia-Hernandez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lesbia Asucena Alay, a native and citizen of Guatemala. Alay conceded her removability but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that her removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her two U.S. citizen children. Alay also applied for asylum and withholding of removal but later withdrew those applications.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Alay's application for cancellation of removal in December 2019, concluding that she had not demonstrated that her removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her children. The IJ found that Alay's children, A.L. and F.L., would remain in the U.S. with their father, who could care for and support them. The IJ acknowledged the potential hardships, including loss of income and separation from their mother, but determined these were not substantially beyond what is normally expected from removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, recognizing the hardships Alay's children would face but agreeing that these did not meet the threshold of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." The BIA noted that A.L. and F.L. were healthy and doing well in school, and concluded that the hardships they would experience were consistent with those ordinarily resulting from the removal of a close family member.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied Alay's petition for review. The court held that the agency had properly considered the evidence and made an individualized assessment of the hardships. The court found no legal error in the agency's determination that the hardships faced by Alay's children did not meet the statutory standard for cancellation of removal. View "Alay v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Walmart, Inc. faced allegations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for 11,103 violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements at 20 locations. These cases were assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Before the ALJ could rule on the merits, Walmart filed a lawsuit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the "good cause" removal procedure for ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Walmart argued that this removal procedure infringed upon the President’s executive power under Article II of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in favor of Walmart, declaring § 7521(a) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the Department and its Chief ALJ from adjudicating ICE’s complaints against Walmart. The district court refused to sever § 7521(a) from the rest of the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the APA’s § 7521(a) is constitutional as applied to the Department’s ALJs in OCAHO. The court reasoned that the ALJs perform purely adjudicative functions, have limited duties, and lack policymaking or administrative authority. Additionally, the decisions of the ALJs are subject to plenary review by the Attorney General, who is removable at will by the President, ensuring sufficient executive control.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction and reversed its entry of summary judgment for Walmart. The court also noted that even if § 7521(a) were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to sever the "good cause" removal restriction, leaving the rest of the APA intact. View "Walmart, Inc. v. King" on Justia Law

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Mohammad M. Qatanani, a Palestinian and citizen of Jordan, was admitted to the United States in 1996 on a work visa. In 1999, he applied to adjust his status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR). An Immigration Judge (IJ) twice granted his application, in 2008 and 2020, after finding in his favor on fact and credibility determinations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the 2008 order, leading the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to vacate and remand the case. The IJ's 2020 order became final when DHS did not appeal within 30 days.The BIA later invoked an agency regulation to self-certify an appeal of the IJ’s 2020 order eleven months after it was issued, ultimately reversing the IJ’s decision and ordering Qatanani removed from the United States. Qatanani petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review of the BIA’s decision.The Third Circuit held that the BIA exceeded its authority by using an agency regulation to undo Qatanani’s adjustment to LPR status in a manner inconsistent with the procedures set out by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court emphasized that once the 30-day appeal period lapsed without an appeal, Qatanani’s adjustment to LPR status became final by operation of law. The court vacated the BIA’s order, reaffirming that the Attorney General must follow the statutory recission process if seeking to revoke LPR status. The court granted Qatanani’s petition for review and vacated the BIA’s order of removal. View "Qatanani v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States without inspection in 2004 to be with his son, Gustavo, a U.S. citizen. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal, claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Gustavo. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner credible but determined he failed to meet the high burden of proving such hardship. The IJ noted Gustavo's behavioral issues but found no evidence of medical or learning disabilities and concluded that Gustavo's mother, who was his primary caretaker, would continue to support him.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on two grounds: first, Gustavo had turned 21 while the appeal was pending, disqualifying him as a qualifying relative; second, the BIA agreed with the IJ's hardship determination. Petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision, which had adopted the IJ's reasoning. The court noted that it could only review legal questions and not factual determinations. Petitioner argued that the BIA failed to state the standard of review, applied the wrong standard, ignored relevant factors, cherry-picked evidence, and improperly required expert reports. The court found no merit in these arguments, noting that the BIA's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the BIA had appropriately reviewed the IJ's findings for clear error and the hardship determination de novo.Ultimately, the First Circuit held that the agency did not err in its hardship determination, finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Gustavo's hardship would be substantially beyond the ordinary hardship expected when a close family member is removed. The petition for review was denied. View "Goncalves Leao v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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The Department of Labor (DoL) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2019 to amend its 2010 regulations regarding the H-2A visa program. In January 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, the DoL announced a final rule and submitted it to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication. However, the rule was withdrawn by the DoL under the Biden Administration before it was made available for public inspection. In 2022, the DoL issued a new rule based on the 2019 NPRM.The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) challenged the withdrawal of the 2021 rule and the promulgation of the 2022 rule, arguing that the 2021 rule was unlawfully repealed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the NCAE lacked standing to challenge the withdrawal of the 2021 rule but had standing to challenge the 2022 rule. The court denied the NCAE's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted the DoL's cross-motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2021 rule had not become final because it was never made available for public inspection by the OFR.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the rulemaking process culminated in the 2022 rule. The court determined that a substantive rule is not final until the OFR makes it available for public inspection. Since the 2021 rule was withdrawn before it became final, the DoL did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the 2022 rule without a new round of notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Council of Agricultural Employers v. DOL" on Justia Law

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Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law