Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the County Sheriff’s Office did not release him. Instead, pursuant to Sheriff Bill Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained in detention. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the appellate court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. "In reaching this determination, we conclude that the statutory language waiving immunity for 'claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted' and who 'can show injury due to negligence' sets a floor, not a ceiling. To hold otherwise would mean that a pre-conviction claimant could recover for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail but not for injuries resulting from the intentionally tortious operation of the same jail, an absurd result that we cannot countenance." Accordingly, the judgment of the division below was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2013 without authorization. The next year, Petition was arrested and ultimately found removable. Petitioner sought relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he would be tortured by the MS-13 gang, the police, or anti-gang vigilante groups if he was deported to El Salvador.The Immigration Judge denied relief, finding Petitioner's testimony was not credible and that there was "less than a fifty percent chance of torture both separately and in the aggregate" that Petitioner would be tortured by any party. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Immigration Judge properly considered the aggregate chance that Petitioner would be tortured by any party. Neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA ignored relevant evidence that Petitioner would be tortured. Further, the BIA used the proper standard when assessing Petitioner's claims. View "Miguel Ibarra Chevez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security’s 2021 Guidance notes that the Department lacks the resources to apprehend and remove all of the more than 11 million removable noncitizens in the country and prioritizes apprehension and removal of noncitizens who are threats to “our national security, public safety, and border security.” “Whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety,” the Guidance says, “requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” The Guidance lists aggravating and mitigating factors that immigration officers should consider and does not “compel an action to be taken or not taken,” and “is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit.”In a suit by Arizona, Montana, and Ohio, the district court issued a “nationwide preliminary injunction,” blocking the Department from relying on the Guidance priorities and policies in making detention, arrest, and removal decisions. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal. The court noted “many dubious justiciability questions” with respect to standing. The Guidance leaves considerable implementation discretion and does not create any legal rights for noncitizens, suggesting it is not reviewable. The preliminary injunction likely causes irreparable harm to the Department by interfering with its authority to exercise enforcement discretion and allocate resources toward this administration’s priorities. A stay pending appeal should not substantially injure the three states. View "Arizona v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered the United States in 2014 when he was apprehended by border patrol agents before eventually being released to his older brother (a resident of North Carolina).On or shortly before his eighteenth birthday, Plaintiff filed an application for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). SIJ status provides certain protections against removal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255 and can lead to lawful permanent residency and citizenship. USCIS issued Plaintiff a Notice of Intent to Deny his SIJ application and Plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which upheld the denial. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in district court seeking review of the agency’s denial of his SIJ applicationOn rehearing en banc, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant Plaintiff’s motion to set aside USCIS’s denial of SIJ status. Following his victory before the en banc court, Plaintiff sought to recover attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The district court denied Plaintiff’s EAJA application, finding the government’s position was “substantially justified.” The Fourth Circuit reasoned that "this was a tough case" involving reasonable arguments on both sides. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling finding the government’s position was substantially justified. View "Felipe Perez v. Ur Jaddou" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought asylum in the United States after the Department of Homeland Security charged that she, her husband, and her minor son were removable as aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. The immigration judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) rejected her application.Petitioner contended that she had been sexually abused throughout her childhood by various males in her life. Further, she alleged that the MS-13 gang threatened her. Despite the police claiming they would investigate the allegations within a few weeks, petitioner fled to the United States.To obtain asylum, petitioner must demonstrate that she is a “refugee” by showing that she has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42)(A). Here, petitioner's persecutors were nongovernment actors. Thus, she must also establish that the authorities were “unable or unwilling to control” them. Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109 (5th Cir. 2006). The court found that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioner did not establish that the government is unable or unwilling to control the persecutors. The fact that police could not complete their investigation to petitioner's satisfaction within a single week does not compel the conclusion that they were unable or unwilling to help her. That alone defeats petitioner's asylum application; the court declined to reach the alternate bases for the BIA’s denial.. View "Sanchez-Amador v. Garland" on Justia Law

In November 2005, Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, was charged with being a removable alien. Petitioner failed to appear at his removal hearing, and he was ordered removed. Petitioner remained in the United States and, in 2013, married a United States citizen. Petitioner’s wife then sought and obtained a visa for Petitioner in 2016.Subsequently, Petitioner and the Department of Homeland Security jointly sought to reopen and dismiss Petitioner’s removal proceedings so he could apply for an immigrant visa. The immigration judge denied relief. Petitioner did not appeal, but filed a second motion to reopen, which the immigration judge denied. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), claiming that his attorney’s ineffectiveness was the cause of his untimeliness. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s case if he establishes equitable tolling applied. The court vacated the BIA’s opinion, remanding the case for the court to consider whether Petitioner can establish his claim was subject to equitable tolling. View "Boch-Saban v. Garland" on Justia Law

Camacho-Valdez, through attorney Thomann, petitioned for review of the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. Thomann filed an emergency motion for a stay of removal, stating in general terms that the petition was likely to succeed because the agency overlooked Camacho-Valdez’s claim that he feared persecution based on family membership and erroneously concluded that he could reasonably relocate within Guatemala. The motion also generally mentioned ineffective assistance of counsel. Thomann did not pay the docketing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis.The Seventh Circuit entered a temporary stay. The government responded that Camacho-Valdez never previously argued that his family membership put him in danger and the stay motion failed to identify any particular flaw in the conclusion that he could safely relocate. Thomann missed the deadline for filing a court-ordered supplement to the motion, then missed an extended deadline despite a reminder. The Seventh Circuit denied the stay motion and ordered Thomann to show cause why he should not be disciplined. He responded a day late that notifications on his smartphone were not working. The court dismissed the petition, finding that excuse unacceptable and noting that the docketing fee remained unpaid. The court imposed a sanction of $1,000, and, noting his history of noncompliance, ordered Thomann to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from the Seventh Circuit bar. View "Camacho-Valdez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), the United States Department of State (“DOS”), and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) appealed from three orders of the district court for the Southern District of New York requiring they produce certain documents in response to FOIA requests filed by the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (“Knight”). The court reasoned that FOIA is premised on “a policy strongly favoring public disclosure of information in the possession of federal agencies.” Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 1999). However, in some circumstances, Congress determined that other interests outweigh the need for transparency. These circumstances are embodied by a limited set of four statutory exemptions from FOIA’s disclosure requirements.Here, the court found that DOS established that the document includes specific guidance to DOS employees on detecting ties to terrorism. Thus, DOS and USCIS properly withheld the first two sets of documents under FOIA Exemption 7(E). However, the court remanded on the ICE issue because the record was unclear regarding whether ICE complied fully with the district court’s order. View "Knight v. USCIS et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner’s husband is a former police officer who joined the auto-defense group to fight local drug cartels in Mexico. Possibly due to his involvement in the group, Petitioner’s husband went missing. Petitioner and her family were threatened by a rival group and eventually moved to Kansas.Petitioner sought admission into the United States in 2016. The Department of Homeland Security determined Petitioner was inadmissible and began removal proceedings. Petitioner acknowledged she was inadmissible, but applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge denied relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BOA”) affirmed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding Petitioner’s testimony credible but insufficient to establish she suffered from “past persecution” or was likely to suffer from future persecution. Petitioner was never physically harmed in Mexico and any threats against her were isolated. Further, there was no effort to carry out any of the threats. View "Guadalupe Barrera Arreguin v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU) filed a complaint against the Calhoun County Jail and Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), alleging CCSO violated Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) when it denied the ACLU’s request for documents. The ACLU sought disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, finding the records at issue were exempt public records from disclosure under the statute. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding error in that court holding a federal regulation had the legal force of a federal statute; "federal regulation is not a federal statute." The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. Calhoun County" on Justia Law