Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries
In re Z.H.
K.M., the mother of minor Z.H., appealed a judgment that terminated her parental rights after the child's father, I.H., and paternal grandmother, C.L., filed a petition under Family Code section 7822. The petition alleged that K.M. had abandoned Z.H. by leaving him in the care of I.H. and C.L. without support or communication for over a year. The trial court found that K.M. had abandoned Z.H. and terminated her parental rights.The Los Angeles County Superior Court consolidated the case with a related custody case and stayed proceedings in the latter. During the trial, evidence showed that K.M. had not visited Z.H. since December 2017 and had not provided financial support since January 2020. The court found that K.M. had abandoned her parental role and focused more on her struggles than on Z.H.'s best interests.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment terminating K.M.'s parental rights, finding no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court noted that K.M. failed to show that the trial court was required to consider any legal impediment to the proposed adoption when terminating her parental rights.However, the appellate court identified a clerical error in the judgment regarding the termination of I.H.'s parental rights. The trial court had intended for I.H. to retain his parental rights. The appellate court remanded the case with instructions to correct the judgment to reflect that I.H. retains his parental rights. View "In re Z.H." on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Family Law
IN RE J.Y.O.
Hakan and Lauren Oksuzler married in 2010 and divorced in 2019. Hakan worked for Bank of America, receiving an annual bonus based on his performance. After their divorce, Lauren sought to have Hakan’s 2019 bonus, paid in February 2020, classified as community property. Additionally, the couple disputed the ownership of their marital home, which Hakan purchased before marriage but refinanced during the marriage, listing both as grantees. They also contested the characterization of Hakan’s 401(k) account, which included contributions made before and during the marriage.The trial court found that the 2019 bonus was Hakan’s separate property, awarded Hakan 100% ownership of the marital home, and classified the majority of the 401(k) funds as Hakan’s separate property. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the bonus and 401(k) classifications but reversed the home ownership decision, ruling that Hakan and Lauren each owned an undivided one-half interest in the home.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the 2019 bonus, paid after the divorce for work performed during the marriage, is community property, reversing the Court of Appeals on this issue. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the marital home should be owned equally by Hakan and Lauren as tenants in common, as Hakan did not rebut the presumption of a gift. Regarding the 401(k) account, the court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hakan failed to provide sufficient evidence to trace the separate property contributions accurately. Thus, the court remanded the 401(k) issue to the trial court for reconsideration.In summary, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment on the bonus, affirmed the judgment on the marital home and 401(k), and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE J.Y.O." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Supreme Court of Texas
USA v. Stinson
Leon Stinson pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in bank fraud and was ordered to pay over $3.6 million in restitution. The Government sought to garnish assets, including retirement accounts solely in the name of Leon’s wife, Ellen. The district court concluded that Ellen’s accounts were marital property in which both Leon and Ellen had a “100% undivided interest” and ordered the liquidation of the accounts to satisfy the restitution order.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment, asserting that Leon had no property interest in her accounts. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Ellen’s retirement accounts were marital property under Mississippi law, as defined in Hemsley v. Hemsley, and thus subject to garnishment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under Mississippi law, property is only classified as marital property during the equitable distribution process in a divorce. Until then, a person does not have an interest in property titled solely in their spouse’s name. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that Ellen’s accounts were marital property subject to garnishment. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s orders and remanded with instructions to grant Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment as to her retirement accounts. View "USA v. Stinson" on Justia Law
In re Parentage of E.A.
A prolonged legal battle ensued between divorced paternal grandparents, each seeking to adopt their grandson, E.A. The boy lived with his grandfather for his first six years until 2019, when his grandmother and her husband took him under false pretenses and initiated an adoption proceeding. The grandfather attempted to intervene in the adoption but was denied "party in interest" status. He also filed an unsuccessful paternity case, claiming he was the boy's presumed father under the Kansas Parentage Act. The adoption court awarded the boy to the grandmother and her husband, and three years later, the court reaffirmed its decision, denying the grandfather's motion to intervene.The grandfather appealed both district court rulings. One Court of Appeals panel denied him relief in the parentage case, while another panel reversed the adoption court's decision, allowing the grandfather to present his case as an interested party. The losing sides sought review in each case.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the cases and reversed the parentage panel's decision while affirming the adoption panel's decision. The court held that the grandfather pled sufficient facts to advance a colorable party-in-interest claim in the adoption proceeding and to prosecute his parentage claim. The court emphasized that the grandfather should have been allowed to intervene in the adoption case to address the competing interests adequately.The Kansas Supreme Court remanded the parentage case to the district court to be consolidated with the adoption case, which was also remanded for further proceedings. The adoption decree was vacated, and the case was directed to return to its status as of May 31, 2019, with the understanding that temporary custody may be reconsidered to determine the boy's best interests. View "In re Parentage of E.A." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Kansas Supreme Court
MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND
Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law
Government Oversight Committee v. Department of Health and Human Services
The case involves a dispute between the Government Oversight Committee of the 131st Maine Legislature and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) over access to confidential records related to the deaths of four children in 2021. The DHHS refused to provide the records, citing confidentiality laws. The Committee then filed an action in the Superior Court (Kennebec County) to compel the DHHS to comply with its subpoena. The Superior Court denied the Committee’s request, and the Committee appealed.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) ruled that the Committee did not have the statutory authority to access the confidential records and denied the motion to compel. The Committee then appealed the decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the Committee does not have the statutory authority to access confidential records under the OPEGA statute, which limits the Committee’s access to public information and records. The Court also found that the statutory exception in 22 M.R.S. § 4008(3)(D) does not apply to the Committee, as it is not considered a “legislative official with responsibility for child protection services.” Additionally, the Court rejected the Committee’s argument that it has inherent legislative power to compel the disclosure of confidential information via subpoena, as this power is limited by the Committee’s statutorily prescribed duties and the nature of the information it may receive. View "Government Oversight Committee v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law
Doe v. Doe
A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law
Nisbet v. Bridger
Andrew Nisbet petitioned for the return of his two young children to Scotland under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The children had been taken to the United States by their mother, Spirit Bridger, in June 2022. Nisbet argued that the children were habitual residents of Scotland and that Bridger had wrongfully removed them.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon, after a bench trial, denied Nisbet's petition. The court found that Nisbet failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were habitual residents of Scotland. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the children's lack of meaningful relationships in Scotland, Bridger's credible testimony that she never intended for Scotland to be a permanent home, and her lack of ties to Scotland.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in its findings. The court emphasized that the district court properly considered the children's lack of meaningful connections in Scotland and Bridger's intentions and circumstances as the sole caregiving parent. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the children did not have a habitual residence in Scotland under the Hague Convention, and therefore, Bridger did not wrongfully remove them. View "Nisbet v. Bridger" on Justia Law
In re J.M.
The case involves the father of J.M. (Father) appealing an order from the Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a neglect petition due to defective service of process. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed the petition after J.M.'s mother passed away, leaving J.M. without a caretaker. Father, who was living in Florida and had not seen J.M. for over a year, was served with the petition by a process server. He argued that service was defective because it was not performed by a law enforcement officer as required by RSA 169-C:8, I.The Circuit Court denied Father's motion to dismiss, and the adjudicatory hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of neglect and an order for J.M.'s out-of-home placement. Father did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the hearing, leading to the waiver of his service of process challenge under Mosier v. Kinley.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with DCYF that Father waived his challenge by not appealing immediately. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's neglect finding, noting that Father had not seen J.M. for 18 months and had not provided any support for two years despite being financially able.The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the neglect finding was supported by evidence and that the trial court did not err in continuing J.M.'s out-of-home placement instead of placing J.M. in Father's custody under DCYF supervision. The Supreme Court clarified that appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are discretionary and must be filed within 30 days. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law
Sulzle v. Sulzle
The case involves a father appealing a district court's order modifying parenting time under a dissolution decree, which included granting the mother sole discretion over all parenting time with their two teenage daughters. The father also appeals the denial of his pro se motion for a new trial, alleging he lacked notice of the modification hearing. The father did not appear at the hearing, but an attorney from the same firm as his attorney of record did appear, cross-examined the mother, and made arguments. The court noted in its modification order that the father was represented by his attorney at the hearing.The district court had previously dissolved the marriage, awarding the mother sole physical custody and both parents joint legal custody of their four children. The father filed a motion for an order to show cause, alleging the mother violated the decree by denying him parenting time and disparaging him to the children. He also filed a complaint for modification, seeking to reduce his child support obligations. The mother counterclaimed, seeking modifications to the custody arrangement and child support.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father's motion for a new trial. The court held that notice to the father's attorney constituted notice to the father, satisfying procedural due process requirements. The court also found that there was a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the parenting plan, including poor communication between the parents and the father's failure to exercise visitation rights.However, the Supreme Court held that the district court's order unlawfully delegated judicial authority to the mother by giving her sole discretion over the father's parenting time with the daughters. The court reversed this part of the order and remanded the case with directions to formulate a reasonable visitation plan in the best interests of the daughters. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's order, including modifications to the father's parenting time with the other two children and the clarification of legal custody. View "Sulzle v. Sulzle" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Nebraska Supreme Court