Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who entered the United States in 1998. In 2009, Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor domestic assault under Tennessee law. The following day, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2015, an immigration judge found Sanchez-Perez ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to establish that he had been continuously present in the United States for ten years prior to receiving the notice to appear. However, the judge also found that Sanchez-Perez was not statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal due to his 2009 domestic-violence conviction.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal and agreed with the immigration judge’s findings that Sanchez-Perez lacked the requisite continuous physical presence and thus was not eligible for cancellation of removal. In 2018, the immigration judge found that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction is categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal from this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in determining that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction was categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court noted that the Tennessee statute at issue criminalizes conduct that does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force. Therefore, the court granted Sanchez-Perez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sanchez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Walid Abdulahad, an Iraqi national who sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on changed country conditions in Iraq. Abdulahad, who had been living in the U.S. since 1997, was ordered removed in absentia in 2006 following a criminal conviction in Aruba. He remained in the U.S. under supervision and filed multiple motions to reopen his case, arguing that he faced a risk of torture if returned to Iraq due to his status as a Chaldean Christian and his ties to the U.S.The BIA denied Abdulahad's latest motion to reopen, finding that his evidence was cumulative of evidence submitted with prior motions, and that he had not established a particularized risk of torture or that each step in his causal-chain claim was more likely than not to occur. Abdulahad petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case back to the BIA. The court found that the BIA had applied the incorrect legal standards when determining whether Abdulahad's evidence was new, cumulative, or material, and had failed to assess Abdulahad's claims in the aggregate. The court also found that the BIA had not sufficiently explained or considered the evidence related to Abdulahad's particularized likelihood of torture. View "Abdulahad v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sandra Sabastian-Andres, an indigenous Mayan Akateko woman from Guatemala, appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' affirmation of the Immigration Judge's decision to deny her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Sabastian-Andres had fled to the U.S. after a man named Pedro threatened her for refusing his demand to become his wife and join his gang.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case under the substantial evidence standard, considering the Board's finding as reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that there was no nexus between the threats Sabastian-Andres received and her identity as a Mayan Akateko woman. Sabastian-Andres's own testimony confirmed that Pedro's threats were not due to her indigenous identity.Additionally, substantial evidence supported the decision that Sabastian-Andres was ineligible for withholding of removal. Despite the less stringent standard for demonstrating a nexus in the context of withholding of removal compared to asylum, the complete lack of a nexus rendered her ineligible.Finally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the decision that Sabastian-Andres did not qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Despite her claims that she could not report Pedro's threats to the police due to language barriers and her belief that the police collaborated with gangs, the court found that the Guatemalan government had taken steps to address gang violence. Therefore, the court denied Sabastian-Andres's petition for review. View "Sabastian-Andres v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gloris Sarai Vasquez-Rivera, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without authorization in 2014, at the age of nine. She was served with a notice to appear in removal proceedings and charged as a noncitizen present in the country without being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. Vasquez-Rivera applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing fear of gang violence in El Salvador.Vasquez-Rivera proposed four social groups for her asylum and withholding of removal claims: Salvadoran women and girls whose parents live outside the country; her family; family members of persons targeted for gang recruitment whose family is threatened when they refuse to join the gangs; and young Salvadoran women considered to be property of the gangs. Both the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found that three of these groups were not cognizable under federal immigration law. As for her family, the BIA assumed it constituted a distinct social group but agreed with the IJ that Vasquez-Rivera did not establish a nexus between this group and the harm she experienced and fears.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to grant in part and deny in part the petition for review. It found that the BIA's conclusions regarding the nexus required for the family-as-a-particular-social-group claim lacked support in the record and amounted to improper de novo factfinding. The case was remanded to the BIA for further proceedings, applying circuit nexus precedent to Vasquez-Rivera’s asylum claim and claim for withholding of removal based on her membership in her family. The court upheld the BIA’s determination that Vasquez-Rivera had failed to establish eligibility for Convention Against Torture protection. View "Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

A former restaurant owner from Mexico, Alma Reyes Galeana, and her three daughters sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States after fleeing violent threats from gangs in Mexico. Reyes Galeana claimed that, as a Mexican business owner, she was a member of a "particular social group" that deserved protection from deportation under federal law. However, both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected this argument, asserting that "Mexican business owners" do not constitute a specific social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board's decision and agreed with the lower courts' rulings. The court ruled that Reyes Galeana's proposed social group of "Mexican business owners" failed on grounds of particularity and social distinction. The court held that this group was neither specifically defined nor perceived as socially distinct in Mexican society. Furthermore, the court maintained that being a target for extortion, a common threat faced by business owners, does not establish membership in a particular social group. The court also found that Reyes Galeana failed to provide evidence that Mexican society perceives business owners as a distinct class of persons subject to persecution.Consequently, the court denied her petition for review, affirming the Board's decision that Reyes Galeana does not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal as a member of a particular social group. View "Galeana v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Indian citizens Sanket and Nehaben Patel who sued the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Ur Jaddou, under the Administrative Procedure Act for unreasonable delay in processing their applications for U visas. After their visas were granted, the Director moved to dismiss the case for mootness and attached an exhibit showing the applications' approval. The Director then realized she had not filed the exhibit under seal, violating the rule prohibiting the disclosure of information relating to noncitizens who are U visa applicants and recipients. The Patels sought civil penalties for the disclosure of their personal information. The district court dismissed the case and denied the Patels' motion for civil penalties, stating that any disclosure was not willful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Director's disclosure of the Patels' visa application status was not "willful" under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The court reasoned that the term "willful" refers to actions that are intentional or knowing, as opposed to accidental. The court noted that the Director realized her mistake in not filing the exhibit under seal, promptly contacted the court to seal the exhibit, and the information disclosed was already revealed in the Patels’ unsealed complaint. Therefore, the disclosure was not considered willful but at most amounted to negligence. View "Patel v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Kingsley Owusu, who was seeking asylum and withholding of removal from the United States. Owusu, originally from Ghana, claimed that he had suffered three violent incidents in his home country due to his political affiliations, leading him to fear future persecution. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals both found that Owusu had failed to demonstrate that the Ghanaian government was unable or unwilling to address the harm he faced from private actors, that his past incidents did not constitute persecution, that he could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he could avoid persecution by relocating within Ghana. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that for Owusu to be eligible for asylum or withholding, he must show state action, either by demonstrating that his persecutor is a state actor or that the Ghanaian government was unable to protect him. The court found that Owusu failed to meet this burden, as he presented no compelling evidence that the Ghanaian police would either persecute him or fail to protect him from persecution. As such, the court denied Owusu's petition for review. View "Owusu v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

This case concerns Ana Sanchez Sebastian-Sebastian, a native and citizen of Guatemala, who appealed the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the BIA did not fully consider whether Sebastian-Sebastian was persecuted due to her membership in certain social groups, including "Guatemalan Chuj Women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" and "Guatemalan Chuj Women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship." The court noted that the BIA ended its analysis prematurely, failing to consider the possibility that Sebastian-Sebastian's persecutors may have had mixed motives for their persecution. The BIA also failed to consider whether her husband's motives were intertwined with her particular social groups. As a result, the court granted Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review in part, vacated the BIA's denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration. However, the court denied Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review regarding her CAT claim and dismissed her due process claim, finding that her right to due process was not violated. View "Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland" on Justia Law

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law